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UCITA’s Imperialism
William J. Woodward, Jr.
William J. Woodward Jr. is a Professor of Law at
Temple University. Professor Woodward expresses
his thanks to Jean Braucher for her comments on
an earlier draft.
Despite strong efforts from its sponsoring organiza-
tion, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the Uniform Com-
puter Information Transactions Act (UCITA) has been
enacted, with modifications, in only two states, Vir-
ginia and Maryland. This important uniform statute,
intended to cover many licensing transactions, partic-
ularly those involving software, must be counted as
less than an unqualified success for NCCUSL. In what
might be regarded as a parallel development, efforts to
narrow the scope of Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code to exclude software transactions met
with strong resistance, ultimately failing during the
summer of 2001. Both of these developments seem to
suggest that many courts will continue to analyze soft-
ware transactions as sales, regardless of the name the
vendor attaches to the transaction. But this might not
be as true as might appear from the dearth of legisla-
tive support of UCITA. There are provisions in both
UCITA and a newly minted Article 1 of the UCC that
could well project the policy decisions of the Maryland
and Virginia legislatures to the furthest reaches of all
of the United States. Those provisions, which give
UCITA tremendous outreach or “imperialism,” are the
focus of this article. What this article will try to show
is how the provisions in UCITA and the new UCC Arti-
cle 1 give UCITA a very strong extraterritorial effect—
strong enough that it in fact may not matter whether
UCITA is enacted anywhere else.1 One’s views of
UCITA will generally determine whether this is a good
or bad thing in a narrow sense, but in a broader sense,
even UCITA proponents might wonder what mischief
these provisions may have unleashed.
SoftMan and Licensing
In the fall of 2001, a Federal Court in California
decided SoftMan Products LLC v. Adobe Systems Inc.2
Notwithstanding the click-wrap intended to proclaim
that the contract was a license, thereby entitling the
vendor to restrict the vendee’s transfer of the soft-
ware, the court held the transaction to be a sale of
goods, which thereby permitted the vendee to disre-
gard the vendor’s restrictions on transfer. 
In SoftMan the ultimate issue was whether Adobe
could restrict SoftMan’s distribution of “unbundled”
components of the Adobe Collections in violation of
the Adobe End User License Agreements (EULA).
SoftMan conceded that it distributed unbundled
Adobe software and that the EULA prohibited it, but
it contended that, for various reasons, the EULA
restrictions were unenforceable.3
At the core of the court’s holding that the contract’s
restrictions were unenforceable was the conclusion,
strongly fueled by federal copyright policy, that the
transaction was a “sale” rather than a “license.” This
analysis meant that the First Sale Doctrine from
copyright law applied to void the restrictions.4 The
court rejected the argument that the click-wrap
license agreement was, under the particular facts of
the case,5 effective to convert what was functionally a
“sale” into a “license.”
SoftMan was decided in California and, even though
copyright policy may have driven the decision,6 it
apparently involved California law.7 The court followed
a distinct line of cases8 that have taken the position
that software vendors transact business through sales,
not licenses, and therefore implications of copyright
law such as the First Sale Doctrine9 follow.10 UCITA, of
course, calls such transactions “computer information
transactions” and, were it applicable in SoftMan,11 it
seems more likely12 that the transaction would have
been termed a “license.”13 A literal reading of UCITA
would then validate the transfer restrictions.14 Addi-
tionally, were proposed revisions to UCC Article 2 suc-
cessful in narrowing its scope to explicitly exclude
software transactions, the court would have had great
difficulty calling the transaction a sale. In either case,
the outcome the court reached in SoftMan would be
less likely.15
UCITA’s imperialism has increased the odds that
the next case similar to SoftMan will be subject to
UCITA, therefore providing a greater likelihood that
the court will hold that the EULA will limit redistrib-
ution of the software—the opposite to the SoftMan
court. The reach of UCITA will expand even further if
California or other states enact the newly-approved
Article 1 of the UCC, provided that such non-UCITA
courts regard SoftMan cases to be somewhere within
the scope of the UCC (e.g., transactions in goods). It
should be emphasized that these developments can
take place without California or a single other state
legislature ever enacting UCITA. Fans of UCITA will
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applaud these developments and may well have antic-
ipated them while contributing to the development of
UCITA. Others may find it problematic that one or
two state legislatures can effectively write the rules
for non-consumers in the rest of the country. 
Current law requires that if the parties to a contract
choose the governing law, they must choose law
“related” to the contract.16 The change to that princi-
ple is located in UCITA § 109 which, with minor
exceptions, permits the parties to a contract governed
by UCITA to choose any law to govern that contract.
To the extent that this UCITA conflict of laws rule is
applicable, people from all over the world can
“choose”—click “I agree” at the little box on their
monitors—the law of Virginia or Maryland, i.e.,
UCITA, to govern their contract. This is true even
though neither legislature otherwise would have any
authority whatsoever over other states’ citizens. The
enacted law of Virginia and Maryland thus can have
very substantial extraterritorial effect. The degree of
this effect depends on two factors: (1) how many
cases within the scope of UCITA will actually be liti-
gated in either Virginia or Maryland; and (2) how
many licensing contracts choose the law of Virginia
or Maryland (or UCITA) to govern the relationship.
Both are empirical questions.
The Importance of Forum
To understand UCITA’s expansive (some might say
unconstitutional17) reach, it is necessary to detour
through some basic principles of Conflict of Laws.
This is the body of law governing the threshold ques-
tion all courts must face: What law should be applied
to the controversy before the court. Given the diver-
sity of state and national law, the answer to this
choice of law question can influence the outcome of
the whole controversy as it well might in a case like
SoftMan. Not surprisingly, the development of con-
flict of laws principles has been the province of the
courts and not the legislatures. 
Perhaps the most basic of the underlying principles
is that the court looks to its jurisdiction’s conflict of
laws principles to determine the governing law. The
local law governs how courts are to decide cases and
applies to a jurisdiction’s courts because they are part
of the legal machinery of the state. In the United
States this means that conflict of laws principles are
matters of state law18 and subject to state-to-state vari-
ation. This, in turn, means that someone can “choose”
the governing conflict of laws principles by litigating
the case in the jurisdiction with the desirable princi-
ples. Put differently, forum shopping works when
someone is shopping for conflict of laws principles. 
If the conflict of laws principles are substantially
similar from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, there is not
much point in shopping for conflicts principles. On
the other hand, when the conflict of laws principles
are different, a person might well be able to affect the
substantive outcome of a case by wisely choosing the
jurisdiction for the litigation.
By enacting UCITA, Virginia and Maryland have
enacted a conflict of laws principle unlike nearly any
other in the United States.19 And because litigants
obtain the choice of law rule of the court in which they
litigate, one party or the other can obtain the UCITA
choice of law rule by taking the litigation to Virginia or
Maryland in order to get it. Because the choice of law
rule can influence the outcome of litigation in cases
such as SoftMan, and because the applicable rule
depends on where the litigation is conducted, it should
be obvious that in some cases the parties will actually
litigate whether the litigation should be transferred to,
or out of , Virginia or Maryland. 
Contests over forum are nothing new to litigators,
and UCITA has given litigators a powerful new reason
to consider it. Because contractual provisions
through which the parties agree to a litigation forum
are common (perhaps pervasive) many such cases
will turn on whether or not the court will enforce a
choice of forum clause in the underlying contract.
UCITA § 110 provides that such clauses are generally
enforceable, but unless the litigation is in a UCITA
state, this provision would not likely apply. Outside
Virginia or Maryland, a forum court will look to its
own contracts principles to determine whether agree-
ment to a particular forum is enforceable and to
other principles to determine if there are overriding
principles suggesting nonenforcement even if there is
agreement. If either Maryland or Virginia is the
forum, it is likely that a contractual choice of forum
will be enforced.
The Substance of UCITA’s
Choice of Law Rule
Because there are complex exceptions for con-
sumer contracts,20 a narrowly-drawn definition that
excludes any small business including sole-practi-
tioner lawyers or doctors,21 the focus of this discus-
sion will be on the general principle applicable to all
but consumer contracts. The new rule of section 109
is: “The parties in their agreement may choose the
applicable law.” The Official Comments make clear
that under the UCITA rule the requirement that the
law chosen be “related” to the parties or transaction
is rejected. This means that two California parties (or
two Belgians, for that matter) could choose Virginia
law to govern their entirely local transaction. The
same would be true of contracting partners from any
other jurisdictions.
With the choice of “unrelated” law likely to be
unenforceable in nearly all domestic jurisdictions,
getting enforcement will require litigation in the
states with the expansive new rule, currently Virginia
or Maryland. To expand the reach of UCITA beyond
MARCH 2002 T h e  L i c e n s i n g  J o u r n a l 3
the borders of Virginia and Maryland, UCITA propo-
nents anywhere in the world merely have to (1)
choose UCITA as the governing law, and (2) get their
litigation into Virginia or Maryland. 
At least in the near term, the first requirement will
probably be met in nearly all contracts within the
scope of UCITA. The substantial involvement of the
software industry in the development of UCITA is
widely thought to confirm that UCITA contains a set
of principles favored and supported by the software
industry. Thus it is expected that those in the industry
will choose UCITA as the governing law and that this
“choice of law” term will appear in the vast bulk of
the contracts within the scope of UCITA: those that
are drafted by the vendors, come on electronic or
paper forms that are seldom read, are non-negotiable,
and (at least if UCITA’s principles apply) are assented
to through shrinkwrap or clickwrap. 
The Mechanics of Choice of
Law in UCITA-Type Contracts
It is easiest to show how the rules will work by
offering some examples of the rules in action.
SoftMan provides a ready-made set of basic facts
on which to base a hypothetical case. Assume a form
software contract entered into between a vendor
located in Florida and a customer located in Califor-
nia. Assume further that the contract contains a
restriction on redistribution and a clause providing:
“The law of Virginia governs this contract.” Because
the enforceability of this latter provision differs
between UCITA states and other states, the enforce-
ability of this clause will depend on where the litiga-
tion is conducted. That, in turn, will depend on who
brings the first lawsuit (and thereby chooses the
forum) and whether the initial forum court will sus-
tain the choice of forum or, alternatively, dismiss the
case without prejudice to refiling in a different forum.
If litigation is brought to (or moved to) Virginia, it
is likely that UCITA will be the governing law. This
would be the case if the vendor brought the lawsuit 
in Virginia. (Exhibit 1 summarizes the analysis.)
Because forum is so critical to enforcing the choice of
law clause, it seems likely that the customer will move
to reject Virginia as an appropriate forum through
challenges to personal jurisdiction, venue, and such.
If the underlying contract had a choice of forum
clause selecting Virginia, the customer could be
expected to challenge (on whatever grounds it could
find) whether such a provision is enforceable. Given
that the Virginia legislature has enacted UCITA,
which specifies that choice of forum clauses be
enforced with narrow exceptions,22 it seems very
likely that a Virginia court would  sustain jurisdiction
in Virginia.
After jurisdiction in Virginia is sustained, the Vir-
ginia court must apply the Virginia choice of law rule
to the controversy. That rule is UCITA 109, and if the
chosen governing law were UCITA, that law would be
used regardless of the connections either party or
their contract had with Virginia. If UCITA were used
to adjudicate the controversy, it is more likely that the
transaction would be a license and that the transfer
Likely enforce choice
of Virginia forum (UCITA
110)
Litigation in
Virginia
Apply Virginia Choice
of Law Rule UCITA 109
Likely enforce vendor
choice of UCITA 
“License,” not “sale”;
EULA is probably enforceable
and restricts transfer under
UCITA 503(2)
Litigation started in Virginia under current law
Florida Vendor
California Licensee
Choice of Virginia law
and forum
Exhibit 1
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restriction (rejected in SoftMan) would be enforced
under UCITA § 503(2).
Suppose, alternatively, that litigation were brought
in California (or Florida). This litigation would likely
be brought by the California customer with a claim
against the vendor or an interest (to be established
through a declaratory judgment or similar proce-
dure) in not having UCITA govern the customer’s con-
troversy with the vendor. The contract will likely have
a choice of Virginia forum clause, so an obstacle to
sustaining the litigation in California will be that
clause in the underlying contract.
Here again, the court must begin with its domestic
contract law in order to adjudicate whether a con-
tractual choice of forum is enforceable. The question
would be analyzed like any other contract question:
Can we find an enforceable “agreement” in what the
parties did?23 A more formal approach would simply
look to the vendor’s form, conclude there was agree-
ment to it, and dismiss the suit because the suit was
in the wrong forum. A less formal approach would
look to the circumstances of the making of the con-
tract, the likelihood that customer choice was actu-
ally involved in the choice of forum, and decide
accordingly whether the provision was binding. If the
court sustains the choice of forum, it will dismiss the
suit and relief will be available in Virginia. When the
Virginia court gets the suit, it will pursue the analysis
outlined in Exhibit 1, which has become the left
branch of Exhibit 2. Enforcement of the restrictions
on transfer is more likely under UCITA than it is
under California law.
As shown in the right branch of Exhibit 2, if the
case remains in California then California will apply
its own choice of law rule to the controversy. That
rule, in a case within the scope of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC), is UCC § 1-105, which requires
that the law chosen by the parties have some rela-
tionship with the parties or their contract.24 If the
case is outside the UCC, the rule is likely to be simi-
lar to the UCC rule: Restatement (Second) Conflicts
of Law § 187 requires enforcement “unless the cho-
Litigation in California under Current Law
Litigation commenced in California
Calif. ct.
enforces contractual
choice of Virginia
Forum; dismisses
suit
Calif. rejects
choice of Virginia
Forum
Calif. applies
Calif. choice of law
rule (UCC 1-105)
Reject UCITA
as “unrelated”; apply
Calif. or Fla. Law
Transaction is license, there-
fore under UCITA 503(2), EIULA
likely limits transfer and Softman is
in violation of license agreement
Transaction is a sale, there-
fore under Softman, restrictions on
transfer are not enforceable
Virginia ct.
applies Virginia
choice of law Rule
(UCITA 109)
Enforce vendor
choice of law (Unless
violates UCIA brand of
‘fundamental public
policy’ (105)
Florida Vendor
California Licensee
Choice of Virginia
law and forum
Exhibit 2
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sen state has no substantial relationship to the par-
ties or the transaction and there is no other reason-
able basis for the parties’ choice.”25 If the court
applies either rule, it will reject the choice of UCITA
because, by hypothesis, Virginia law had nothing to
do with the parties or their contract. A court pursu-
ing this analysis is likely26 to apply California law to
the problem and reach the actual SoftMan result.27
Practice Implications of
UCITA’s Choice of Law Rule
It should be obvious that the effectiveness of
license terms can depend on the law that is applied in
analyzing them and that, therefore, contractual
choice of law will be an important consideration
either in planning or in litigation. Had SoftMan been
decided under UCITA, the result might well have been
different than that reached by the court. 
The enforceability of a contractual choice of law
clause depends, under current law, on the place in
which the litigation takes place. Particularly, those
licensors that consider UCITA to be a licensor-friendly
legal regime need to get the litigation into Virginia or
Maryland, states that have enacted UCITA and will
therefore recognize the choice of UCITA as governing
law. Conversely, those who believe that UCITA presents
a less than optimal legal regime will want to avoid a
choice of law clause selecting UCITA as the governing
law or (assuming neither they nor the vendor have a
presence in a UCITA state)28 will want to keep any liti-
gation over the contract out of a UCITA state. 
For planners wishing to avoid application of
UCITA, this also means avoiding a choice of forum
clause selecting a UCITA state as the exclusive forum
for litigation. This may be possible when contracts
are actually negotiated, but such contracts are
unlikely in most situations. It is widely believed that
in the bulk of software contracts, the vendee will have
little awareness of the contract’s terms and no ability
to negotiate over them. Much software is distributed
under take-it-or-leave-it adhesion contracts when
negotiating over terms is neither contemplated nor
permitted. The tiny box on the computer screen does
not invite responses other than “I accept” or “I
decline.” This take-it-or-leave-it aspect may be partly
accountable for the likely fact that few vendees will
actually peer into the box, but will instead simply
click “I agree” in order to get on with the software
installation. Moreover, if a vendee were to peep into
the box to find a choice of law clause, he or she would
be unlikely to understand the implications of the
clause sufficiently to make a decision whether to
accept or decline the contract’s terms.
Thus, there will be cases when a dispute will arise
under a contract with a UCITA choice of law clause
when the vendee’s litigation lawyer will first recognize
the implications of applying UCITA to the dispute and
will want to contest it. For example, had SoftMan
contained a clause choosing UCITA as governing law,
SoftMan’s trial lawyer would have wanted to resist its
application in the dispute over redistribution of the
software. Avoiding the choice of UCITA as governing
law will, in most cases, require that the vendee’s
lawyer keep the litigation out of a UCITA state where
the choice of UCITA will be more likely to be
enforced. If the vendee is the plaintiff, this will involve
bringing suit in a non-UCITA jurisdiction and then
persuading the Court to disregard the likely choice of
forum clause. If the vendor is the party with the claim
(as was Adobe in SoftMan) the vendee will want to
choose the forum by bringing a declaratory judgment
or similar action seeking clarification of the implica-
tions of the software contract. 
Proposed Article 1 of the UCC
As suggested by the foregoing examples, the near-
universal choice of law rule outside the UCITA con-
text is that the law chosen by the parties must bear
some relationship with the parties or underlying
transaction. UCITA’s rule permits the parties to
choose any law, including the law of a jurisdiction
that has nothing to do with them or their contract. As
explained, this would have the likely effect of altering
the result in SoftMan if litigation were brought in a
UCITA state. When the choice of forum can apprecia-
bly influence the result in litigation, forum shopping
(both through choice of forum clauses and through
litigation strategy) is the result.
A recent amendment to Article 1 of the UCC may
make it unnecessary for a vendor to bring the litiga-
tion to a UCITA state in order to have UCITA govern
its contract. The change, UCC § 1-301,29 not yet
enacted in any state, will permit parties to any con-
tract governed by the UCC to choose any domestic
law to govern their contracts.30
The implications of such a change are to reverse
the likely choice of law analysis just described. If, for
example, the new UCC rule were in place for the Soft-
Man litigation, the result might well have been differ-
ent for the very court that decided the case. The
analysis can be found in Exhibit 3.
Under Proposed UCC § 1-301, the court begins with
the question “what body of law governs this dispute.”
If the court sustains a choice of law clause in the con-
tract, the contents of that clause will govern; if the
clause is not enforced, the court will use its own con-
flict of laws principles to determine the law to be
applied. The enforceability of the choice of “unrelated”
Virginia law in this hypothetical case thus depends on
the content of California’s choice of law rule. 
Under the regime of a new Article 1, the choice of
law rule itself will depend on what sort of transaction
is involved. If the transaction is within the scope of the
UCC, the UCC’s new rule requiring no relationship will
govern. If, on the other hand, the transaction is not
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within the scope of the UCC, then general conflict of
laws principles that embody the “relatedness” require-
ment will govern. It seems quite likely that many
courts will continue to regard the distribution of boxes
of software to be “transactions in goods” thereby
bringing them within the new UCC choice of law rule. 
Under current UCC § 1-105, as explained, the Cali-
fornia court would have likely rejected a choice of
Virginia law because it was unrelated to the contract.
Under proposed UCC § 1-301, by contrast, the court
would lack a “relatedness reason” to deny enforcement
and would more likely enforce the choice of unrelated
Virginia law (UCITA). Having done that, the court would
then more likely enforce the SoftMan restrictions on
redistributing unbundled software and find that Soft-
Man’s redistribution was a breach of the license.31
Implications
Supporters of UCITA will press for its enactment
outside of Virginia and Maryland and will, similarly,
press for the enactment of new UCC § 1-301 because
both of these enactments will expand the reach of
UCITA. Foes of UCITA will do the opposite.
But there are larger implications that are worth
pondering. For example, if the SoftMan decision
embodies some aspects of California policy applica-
ble to California businesses,32 then Virginia’s enact-
ment of UCITA overrides that policy provided (1)
there is a choice of UCITA in the contract and (2) that
litigation occurs in a UCITA state. Even if California
were to make such clauses unenforceable in Califor-
nia, a Virginia court would have to weigh that Cali-
fornia policy against its own legislature’s mandate to
enforce such clauses.33 States have not yet reacted to
UCITA with criminal provisions, for example, making
it a crime either to click agreement to UCITA or to
include a UCITA choice of law clause in a software
contract. It seems unlikely they will do so. 
The effect, when projected beyond California, is
the possibility that UCITA will govern software con-
tracts coast-to-coast, provided that vendors insert
choice-of-UCITA clauses into their contracts and can
manage to get their litigation into a UCITA state. 
The power of the Virginia and Maryland legisla-
tures to set the rules for the rest of the country
expands to the extent that states adopt new UCC § 1-
301. With narrow exceptions for consumer contracts
and fundamental policy, that new rule would call on
enacting state courts to use UCITA (if selected in the
software contract) provided that the contract came
within the very wide scope of the UCC as cases such
as SoftMan implicitly do.34 The implication is that
those who have specified in their forms that UCITA
should govern their transactions will not need to bring
Litigation commenced in California
Calif. ct.
enforces choice of
Virginia Forum;
dismisses suit
Calif. ct.
rejects choice of
Virginia Forum
Calif. applies
new Calif. choice of
law rule (UCC 1-301)
Use Virginia
Law (UCITA or what-
ever Virginia enacts)
Virginia
applies Virginia
choice of law Rule
(UCITA 109)
Exhibit 3 
Litigation in California under Proposed UCC 1-301
Florida Vendor
California Licensee
Choice of Virginia
law and forum
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their litigation to Virginia or Maryland in order to get
UCITA’s choice of law rule. They will be able to get a very
similar rule by litigating their case in a UCC 1-301 state.35
Of course, it could be argued that the Virginia or
Maryland legislatures are not projecting rules at all;
rather, the vendees themselves are selecting UCITA
rules in their software contracts. Though this might
be plausible in very large contracts where choice of
law is actually negotiable, it is not true in any but a
very formal sense in the vast bulk of software con-
tracts. The fact that UCITA defines some act as
“assent” does not make it empirically so and cannot
be used for policy support for imposition of the rules
themselves. These contracts are primarily vendor
contracts where the choice of law is given on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis, and where, in addition, it is
unlikely that the vendee is even aware of the choice of
law clause. 
Indeed, in this context, the idea of assent confuses
the issues more than it clarifies them because there
will be little other than a purely formal form of assent
in the overwhelming majority of cases—recall that
Adobe argued that SoftMan assented merely by han-
dling boxes with a sign on them that cross-referenced
terms that were unavailable.36
Thus, if a Virginia court applies UCITA to a foreign
or unrelated contract, it is collaborating with contract
drafters to project its legislature’s enactments beyond
its borders to govern those who give formal assent
and nothing else to the application of UCITA.
Someone may view UCITA as sound policy, yet
wonder if legislative imperialism will end with
UCITA. The precedent that it sets, reinforced and
expanded by the proposed UCC Article 1 provision,
means that no one is free from the decisions of
another state’s legislature, if the subject matter is
within the broad scope of the UCC or if an imperial-
ist legislature includes a choice of law provision sim-
ilar to UCITA’s in the legislation.37 Any group with the
lobbying power to create desirable legislation in one
state could amplify the effects of that legislation by
including a UCITA-type choice of law provision in
the legislation and insisting on contractual choice of
law terms selecting that desirable law in their con-
tracts. It is hard to imagine what this future state leg-
islation might look like or, if the UCITA precedent
becomes widespread, what it will do to notions of
Federalism.
1. There are qualifications and exceptions to nearly everything that follows
but there is insufficient space or reader patience to develop all the ins
and outs here. Those wishing a full treatment should see William J.
Woodward, Jr., “Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative Choice in an Era
of Party Autonomy,” 54 S.M.U. Law Rev. 697 (2001).
2. SoftMan Prods. LLC v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 2001 WL 1343955 (C.D. Calif.
October 19, 2001).
3. SoftMan had somewhat unusual facts. SoftMan never had to load the
software and, therefore, never assented with its mouse. The court
rejected Adobe’s claim that SoftMan was bound by the legend on the out-
side of the boxes telling the reader that she was bound by the license on
the inside. SoftMan at 7. This freed the court to consider, apart from the
terms of any purported contract, whether the transaction was a license
or a sale.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Because SoftMan was not an end user, it never loaded the software or
was given an opportunity to click an assent. Id. at 6. Purported assent to
the terms on the disk inside the box on the basis of labels on the pack-
aging was rejected by the court. Id. The court referred to the click-to-
agree EULA as “shrinkwrap” rather than the newer term “clickwrap.”
6. In arriving at the conclusion that the transaction was a sale rather than
a license, the court relied in part on David A. Rice, “Licensing the Use of
Computer Program Copies and the Copyright Act First Sale Doctrine,”
30 Jurimetrics J. 157 (1990), an article maintaining the copyright policy
overrides vendors efforts to escape the First Sale Doctrine by calling
their transactions licenses.
7. The SoftMan court does not directly focus on the applicable law but
notes that Adobe made unfair competition claims against SoftMan
under the California Business & Professional Codes Section 17200 et
seq. Id. at note 21. 
8. See Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 676 (3d Cir.1991);
Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d. Cir. 1991);
Downriver Internists v. Harris Corp., 929 F.2d 1147, 1150 (6th Cir. 1991).
9. If the First Sale doctrine were to apply to a given transaction, it would
not matter whether the transaction were called a sale or a license in the
contract. State law is powerless to convert what is functionally a sale
into a license in order to avoid the federal policy embodied in the First
Sale doctrine. See generally Rice, supra n.6.
10. Another potential implication is that calling a software transaction a sale
subjects it to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq.
That act applies to tangible personal property, and would likely not apply
to software transactions if they were considered to be licenses.
11. If this case were to arise in a UCITA jurisdiction, UCITA would define the
transaction as a “computer information transaction” and thereby bring
it within its scope. UCITA §§ 102(12) and 103.
12. If this case were to arise in a UCITA jurisdiction, UCITA would define
the transaction as a “computer information transaction” and thereby
bring it within its scope. UCITA §§ 102(12) and 103.
13. UCITA § 102 (41) defines “license” in part as “a contract that authorizes
access to, or use, distribution, performance, modification, or reproduc-
tion of, information or informational rights, but expressly limits the
access or uses authorized or expressly grants fewer than all rights in the
information whether or not the transferee has title to a licensed copy.”
UCITA thus attempts to convert nearly all computer information con-
tracts into licenses provided the vendor has the good sense to restrict
some aspect of the vendee’s use. 
UCITA § 112 defines “manifesting assent” to include “intentionally
engag[ing] in conduct or mak[ing] statements with reason to know that
the other party . . . may infer from the conduct or statement that the per-
son assents to the record or term.” If vendee agreement that the trans-
action was a license were necessary under UCITA, Adobe would have
argued that the standard was satisfied when SoftMan read the labels on
the software containers subjecting those who dealt with the software to
the contents of the license agreements inside.
14. UCITA § 503(2) makes restrictions on transfer generally enforceable.
Notwithstanding § 502(2), if the case were analyzed under UCITA, the
court could arrive at the SoftMan result by engaging in a preemption
analysis to apply the First Sale doctrine to the case notwithstanding the
contract terms. UCITA § 105(a) provides that “A provision of this [Act]
which is preempted by federal law is unenforceable to the extent of the
preemption.”
15. Although no lawyer’s prediction is infallible, many would predict a dif-
ferent outcome to SoftMan under UCITA than under the set of rules that
the court used in the case. Calling the transaction a license rather than
a sale tilts the rules in the direction of enforcement of the restrictions on
redistribution. In Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d
1086 (N. D. Calif. 2000), the court inferred from the many restrictions on
transfer in the underlying contract that the transaction was a license and
not a sale and therefore the transfer restrictions were enforceable.
16. See, e.g., UCC § 1-105; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187;
Application Group, Inc. v. The Hunter Group, 61 Cal. App. 4th 881, 896
(1998) (California law).
17. Cf. Richard K. Greenstein, “Is the Proposed UCC Choice of Law Provi-
sion Unconstitutional,” 73 Temple L. Rev. 1159 (2000).
18. See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–497
(1941).
19. The precedents for the new rule are few and narrow, generally applying
only to large transactions among sophisticated parties. See generally
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Woodward supra n.1 at 740–745.
20. UCITA § 109(a), (b), and (c).
21.“Consumer” is defined as:
an individual who is a licensee of information or informational
rights that the individual at the time of contracting intended to be
used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. The
term does not include an individual who is a licensee primarily for
professional or commercial purposes, including agriculture, busi-
ness management, and investment management other than man-
agement of the individual’s personal or family investments.
UCITA § 102(15).
A “consumer contract” is “a contract between a merchant licensor and a
consumer.” UCITA § 102(16). I discuss the incoherence of UCITA’s con-
sumer exception Woodward, supra n.1 at 731.
22. UCITA § 110 provides for enforcement of a choice of forum clause
“unless the choice is unreasonable and unjust.” Official Comments make
it clear that the exception is to be narrowly interpreted.
23. There may be statutes addressing this problem, one way or the other. For
example, UCITA has its own choice of forum provision in § 110. If liti-
gation arises in a UCITA state in a contract involving something within
UCITA, it seems likely a court would use the UCITA rule and conclude
that the choice of forum clause was enforceable. An example of a provi-
sion that limits the parties in their choice of forum is UCC § 2A-106 mak-
ing unenforceable the choice of a forum other than a forum that
otherwise would have jurisdiction in a consumer customer’s leasing con-
tract subject to UCC Article 2A.
24. The mere fact that the parties have chosen unrelated law is probably
insufficient to establish the connection sufficient to make the law related
to them or their contract.
25. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2).
26. In an interstate contract between the Florida vendor and California
vendee, it is possible that the court would apply Florida law to the con-
troversy if the connection between Florida law and the transaction was
greater than was the connection between California law and the trans-
action. If the question were close, the court would likely use familiar Cal-
ifornia law.
27. This assumes, of course, that the California court would follow SoftMan
and not Adobe Systems Inc, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, an earlier California
case that came out the other way. 
28. If either the vendor or vendee are located in a UCITA state, UCITA will
be related to the contract or the parties and, under the non-UCITA
choice of law rules in force nearly everywhere, the choice of UCITA as
governing law will be enforceable.
29. There is a detailed analysis of both the proposed UCC provision and of
the UCITA choice of law rule in Woodward supra n.1.
30. There are, of course, qualifications and exceptions. The new rule will
limit domestic parties to the choice of domestic law, create a different
rule for consumer contracts, and provide for nonenforceability if
enforcement would violate a narrowly-defined fundamental policy.
None of these is likely to be of use in a contract such as that involved in
SoftMan.
31. An argument making the rounds goes something like this. New UCC § 1-
301 is very limited: it says it only “applies to a transaction to the extent
that it is governed by another Article of [the UCC].” Somehow this lim-
iting provision is said to close the UCITA back door.
While one might wish for such a result, it is hard to see how it comes
from the new UCC provision. SoftMan was not in any sense a “mixed
transaction” with which the quoted language might deal. It was, rather,
the conveyance of something moveable that had value. Efforts to explic-
itly exclude such transactions from the scope of UCC Article 2 were
rejected by its sponsoring organizations. The implication is that such
transactions can be subject to Article 2 and case law establishes that
some are subject to it. If a court found SoftMan subject to the UCC or
Article 2, it would then have to use the UCC choice of law rule that
explicitly applies to such transactions. 
32. As suggested earlier, it may be that federal, not California, policy is
behind SoftMan. The discussion in the text uses SoftMan as a possible
illustration of a decision that may embody some aspects of California
policy. The broader point is that UCITA’s imperialism could effectively
override many aspects of California policy.
33. UCITA’s choice of law rule has given rise to so-called bomb shelter pro-
visions:  State laws that provide that agreements to have UCITA apply to
contracts of a State’s citizens are unenforceable. Again, a UCITA state
court would have to recognize such a provision in order for it to have
real effect. 
States have not yet reacted to UCITA with criminal provisions, for exam-
ple, making it a crime either to click agreement to UCITA or to include
a UCITA choice of law clause in a software contract. It seems unlikely
they will do so.
34. Both UCITA and proposed UCC § 1-301 permit a court to deny enforce-
ment of chosen law for fundamental policy reasons. Both statutes
instruct that fundamental policy is to be very narrowly construed.
Whether a California court would regard its legislative rejection of
UCITA to be fundamental policy in a case involving the choice of UCITA
as governing law is an open question but, based on the Official Com-
ments to both provisions, it seems unlikely.
35. Even if California had enacted a “bomb shelter” that other State courts
would recognize, the change in the UCC would still be useful to vendors.
For example, as suggested earlier, a narrowed scope of Article 2 was
defeated this past Summer at the NCCUSL Annual Meeting. This means
that State courts can continue to follow cases like SoftMan. But suppose
an industry group prevailed on State X to narrow its scope of Article 2
and then inserted a choice of State X’s law into its form contracts. Sim-
ilar to the analysis in Exhibit 3, the California court would initially find
the choice of law rule in the UCC, in new § 1-301. That provision would
instruct the court to apply the law of State X. State X’s law would pro-
vide no coverage by the UCC. The California court would then have to
analyze the case without the use of the sales analogies it used in Soft-
Man. Other mandatory rules within the official UCC could be altered in
a similar way by one State’s altering them and then some industry’s form
contracts choosing the law of that State to govern the contract.
36. Softman at 6.
37. Virginia’s tendencies in this direction are worth noting. Its legislature
has developed in subsection (b) of its UCITA a nonuniform amendment
which reads as follows: “In the absence of an enforceable agreement on
choice of law, the contract is governed by the law of Virginia.” This
amendment, of course, exports UCITA to any software contract that has
no choice of law clause, provided again, that the litigation is brought to
Virginia. In addition to making its own courts’ workload a little easier,
this provision gives those who find UCITA desirable, but did not get a
choice-of-UCITA clause into their contracts, a reason or “incentive” to
litigate their cases in Virginia. Compare Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E.
Ribstein, “Uniformity, Choice of Law and Software Sales,” 8 Geo. Mason
L. Rev. 261, 294 (1999), advocating legislative imperialism as an avenue
to uniformity, and economic benefits, for a State so persuaded.
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